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1. Introduction
During the last twenty years, the communitarian system of Multi Level Governance (MLG)
becomes the EU model of territorial policies governance. In the EU MLG, different jurisdiction levels
participate to decision-making system and regions assume a relevant role in development policies.
This article aims either to show the effects of such a model on Italian territorial policies and to
evaluate the impacts of decentralization policies on the dynamic and the dimension of regional GDP.
In the 1990s there was a relevant change in Italian policies for Mezzogiorno (less developed
regions of the South). This change was driven by the principle of EU MLG system. Such a system,
mostly led by Public Institutions, aims at the reduction of transaction costs, being based on principles
directed to increase the number of decision-makers, as well as to make both governing levels and
processes of institutional coordination more effective. As a consequence, the same Italian reforms aim
to reorganize the division of public competencies among several levels of government.
The political and administrative impact on the Italian regional policy governance is indeed
rather relevant, but the pattern of reforms is only partially coherent with the principle of Institutional
MLG. The process needs to be accompanied by a strong empowerment action of both efficiency and
effectiveness in regional political activity. Furthermore, the decentralization of competencies is not
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2followed by a symmetrical decentralization of capital expenses from central to local administration.
Therefore, a weak contribution to GDP is expected as result of the study.
The contribute is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the main features of the EU MLG
and describes as such a model aims to minimise coordination costs. Section 3 deals with the process of
“europeization” of Italian territorial policy and investigates the coherence of Constitutional reforms
with EU MLG principles. Section 4 presents the data base used in the analysis. In Section 5 a model is
proposed to verify that: (i) the decentralization to local jurisdictions (regions and local bodies) of
programming competencies does not involve a transfer of competencies on management of capital
public expenditure; (ii) the introduction of the decentralization model of territorial policies and the
empowerment of all Italian regions do not have a significant effect on economic macro aggregate of
GDP. A brief description of the main results end the paper (Section 6).
2. The genesis and theoretical basis of the Multi Level Governance (MLG) system for EU
structural intervention
2.1 The MLG institutional model: general features
Mainly starting from the approval of the European Single Act (ESA), the European integration
process experiences a strong “creeping competences” course (Pollack, 1994) and the multi-level
model becomes the main governance system characterizing the policy-making mechanism for EU
public policies (Multi Level Governance). During the last twenty years, most of the EU Countries
recorded important dynamics of public functions “double devolution”: Central Governments
progressively lose control over political economy in favour of both supra-national and sub-national
institutions. A not negligible proliferation of policy-making processes (Pollack, 1994, Wallace, 1996;
Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999; Fabbrini, 2002; Nugent, 2003; Alesina et al., 2005; Borzel, 2005) can be
detected. The analysis of the Communitarian policy-making system strongly confirms this evidence by
stressing the existence of specific decisional systems for each policy agenda.
1
Since the approval of the ESA (1986) and the Structural Funds’ Reform (1988), the MLG
model represents the decisional scheme, fully characterizing the EU territorial policy, named
“cohesion policy”. The programming system of the development policies, co-financed by Structural
Funds, is based on a multi-level division of public spending responsibilities among different levels of
governance as well as on a strong empowerment of local bodies, in particular Regional Governments
and Institutions.
2
 The main factors underpinning the MLG of EU territorial policy and contributing to
the success of the empowerment of local bodies are: (i) the increasingly relevance of the “subsidiarity
principle”; (ii) the shift of the EU development policies from a sectorial to a territorial approach in the
1990s (local development and bottom-up approach); (iii) the political and administrative
decentralization process experienced by several European Countries.
3
The EU MLG decision making system relies on a very strict institutional framework known as
“type I MLG” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001a; Marks and Hooghe, 2004) where Public Authorities
constitute the main actors. Nevertheless, it is possible to define a different MLG system based on a
“soft” institutional framework where the decision-making system is “polycentric” and individual
citizens (or specific lobbies) constitute its main actors (Hooghe and Marks, 2001b; Marks and Hooghe,
2004).
4
This paper investigates the "institutional" MLG system. The main reasons are:
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 This type of MLG, mainly because of this characteristic, has a logical link with both neoclassical economic
theory and public choice theory. In addition, their institutional boundaries and membership schemes are highly
flexible. As a consequence, several kinds of MLG system can be defined (Skelcher, 2005).
31. "institutional" MLG may be viewed as an extension of the "vertical subsidiarity" scheme
regulating relationships among different EU jurisdiction levels. Furthermore, it characterizes
programming and management system of the EU territorial policy;
2. EU MLG "institutional" features allow a specific analysis of the administrative and
constitutional reforms that the Italian government carried out during the last ten years.
In the EU "institutional" MLG system, «authority and policy-making influence are shared
across multiple levels of government» (Hooghe and Marks, 2001a, p. 2). Several "general purpose"
jurisdictions – supra-national, national and local - negotiate rules and allocation of funds in the policy-
making process.
Table 1: Main characteristics of the "institutional" MLG.
“General purpose” jurisdictions Although it may exist a specialization of public functions, all jurisdictions
can pursue multiple public objectives and manage different instruments of
policy.
Strong relationship of each
jurisdiction with:
a) territorial domain
b) membership
Each jurisdiction has a strict system of both territorial and membership
boundaries. At any territorial scale, there exists only one relevant
jurisdiction.
Dispersion of a few jurisdictions
across a limited number of
governing levels
The “general purpose” nature of each jurisdiction and the objective of
coordinating costs reduction imply the existence of few jurisdictions
allocated among a limited number of governance levels.
Strict institutional framework The institutional system is stable over time and there exists a strict
allocation of "prerogatives", ruled by a hierarchic legislative corpus.
The institutional hierarchy implies an inelastic vertical subdivision of
competencies.
The "institutional" MLG and the process of regions empowerment have a strong relationship
with the theory of "fiscal federalism".
5
 The attribution of political “prerogatives” among different
government levels must be coherent with territorial dimension of “public goods” externalities.
6
"Institutional" MLG would be the best governing system to efficiently allocate spill over effects of
"public goods" and "merit goods" among different government levels. In other words, "institutional"
MLG should contribute to the local "internalization" of such spill over effects (Marks and Hooghe,
2004; Perraton and Wells, 2004).
These conclusions are supported by the Oates’ (1972) assumption of citizens’ preferences
varying considerably among different levels of membership and territorial-based jurisdictions. This
behaviour represents one of the main reasons justifying programming and management multi-level
models of the EU territorial policy. In fact, by adopting the "institutional" MLG, EU institutions try to
match the heterogeneous territorial demand for public policies with any possible extent.
7
It is worth noting that the latter procedure is a direct consequence of the citizens' aspiration "to
keep the policy home" that, together with different territorial identities and heterogeneity of social
demands, constitutes a key variable in the allocation of political "prerogatives" among different
jurisdictions (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999). As confirmed by Italian constitutional reforms, all these
variables are potentially able to reverse and divert tasks allocations’ schemes otherwise resulting cost-
efficient and optimal frameworks for the system considered as a whole. The awareness of all European
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4citizens about the positive effects of the EU integration process is maximized: this effect represents
one of the indirect effects of the "cohesion policy" (Bachtler, 2002; Jouen, 2005).
Despite of the advantages discussed above, the multi-level governance system generates some
costs. They are determined by the need of a constant dialogue within each institution (i.e. mostly
transaction costs) as well as among different institutions.
The system is designed to reduce coordination and settlement costs originated by
“prerogatives” allocation among different jurisdictions. The theoretical model implies few levels of
governance from top to bottom. In this framework, all jurisdictions are able to manage “operational
groups” in accordance with a system supported by rather inelastic institutional structure, constituted by
normative acts with well established powers: a limited number of institutions allows to simplify
internal governance procedures for joint operations by drastically reducing interactions to share
information.
Furthermore, the system is governed by a pyramidal hierarchical structure headed by an
institution able to provide the system with general directions. This power arrangement gives the
necessary stability to the system and, as a consequence, potentially allows to rapidly overcome any
institutional conflicts.
The communitarian MLG model is characterized by the absence of overlapping territorial
authorities (i.e. the number of multi-objective jurisdictions is indeed limited and institutional
constraints are firmly determined by territorial boundaries, inspired by the principle of territorial
identity).
The MLG model presents many structural limitations:
i. the rigid institutional framework and the jurisdictional boundaries characterizing the political
architecture of the MLG model determine operational difficulties in the implementation of
structural changes. Decisional procedure constraints either prevent to the establishment of new
institutional structures jurisdictions and make them particularly expensive in terms of social
and economic costs;
ii. strong territorial identities and inelastic membership arrangements limit institutional
development, exacerbating resistance to the creation of supra-national or supra-regional
jurisdictions;
iii. the MLG system strongly depends on the managerial and administrative skills of the full set of
institutions. A suitable level of administrative efficiency in every jurisdiction is indeed
essential to ensure the whole MLG system efficient functioning and to reduce the coordination
costs. Furthermore, an inefficient jurisdiction can easily disappoint citizens and, given the
limited opportunity to “voice”, determine social tension (Hirschman, 1970).
Recent experiences in Italy and Europe confirm the difficulty characterizing processes of
reform of already operating MLG systems. The difficulties Italy encountered while modifying Title
Five of the Constitution or, generally speaking, the problems connected to the modification of
constitutionally defined set of rules are examples of the mentioned problems. The recent campaigns
before referendums for the approval of the community’s new Constitution emphasized the existence of
‘localized’ resistance, determined by more or less strong territorial identities. The dismission of the
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (1984) and the end of the extraordinary intervention (1992) in Italy
demonstrate the difficulties that the overall institutional system supports while promoting social
consensus on redistributive interventions. Moreover, the Italian case stresses the possibility of inter-
institutional conflicts exacerbated by system inefficiency (particularly relevant in the Southern
regional Administrations) (Viesti, 2001a, 2003).
In conclusion, the recent Structural Funds Reform for the programming cycle 2007-2013
highlights as the existence of different degrees of managerial and administrative institutional
efficiency can lead to sub-optimal governance solutions. As a consequence, in the context of the new
programming cycle, the Commission proposes a broad set of reforms in particular aimed to manage
the entire Funds system and to implement interventions. Such changes do not derive from the search
5of a reasonable balance between costs and benefits of the overall institutional architecture of the EU
territorial policy, while they originate from awareness of the need to continue supporting capacity
building process in new Member States, certainly weaker at the administrative level (Bonetti, 2005;
Bagarani and Bonetti, 2005).
2.2 The expenditures planning for development in the Structural Fund’s MLG system
The “institutional” MLG model represents the framework for the “cohesion policy” since the
1988 Structural Funds Reform: the Reform adds the institutional partnership idea (principle of
subsidiarity) to the Funds’ basic principles.
The “cohesion policy” empowers regional governments all over the European Countries. It
defines legislative frameworks as well as main purposes of operational programs by a pyramidal
hierarchy structure. In this context, regions become the core of programming and fulfilling process.
Graph 1 points out the model organization in the Italian case.
Graph 1: Simplified diagram of relations within a Multi Level Governance system.
In the above described model, decisional mechanism is based mostly on two points: (i)
harmonization of different institutional levels (usually occurring through bilateral or multilateral
negotiations); (ii) general agreement on the degree of decisional power each level of jurisdictional
level is provided with.
In Graph 1, the MLG model logical structure is placed within the organization framework
emerging from the analysis of the characteristics of the Structural Funds Reforms, in general directed
to strengthen regions’ autonomy, especially during the executive phase. Therefore, whilst on one hand
there is a succession of regulations, and national and regional laws, on the other hand there is a
conspicuous reverse process in terms of implementation and achievement of the aims. In particular,
the model provides for the coordination of activities through the definition of shared and legally
binding regulations and procedures. The other way round, in order to accomplish local micro as well
as classic macro socioeconomic goals, the realization of a linked target system is provided within the
“bottom-up” model. Final objectives are reached through the implementation of structural expenditure
programs spread over years (Bagarani and Bonetti, 2005).
Given the above discussed characteristics, the MLG model is substantially different from the
classical governance system summarized in the two formulas, i.e. top-down and bottom-up. In the
framework of the communitarian MLG, those formulas are both included, each one endowed with its
own “specialization”.
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6For the model to be successful, several institutional conditions need to be satisfied:
 i) high coordination capability between all the involved institutional levels;
 ii) general agreement on the political choices at all jurisdictional levels;
 iii) management skills in the coordination and implementation of programmatic choices at all
governance levels;
 iv) ability to match society preferences, i.e. each program must provide for a set of interventions
consistent with existing preferences scheme;
 v) ability to implement planned interventions in accordance with phases and procedures shared
with all institutional actors.
The MLG model requires as essential conditions some “objective” conditions formally outside
the single institution that exist inside the system (such as the presence of shared rules decided on the
basis of a general consensus between all the parts involved in the concert action). At the same time,
”subjective“ conditions, based on internal managerial skills, are equally indispensable.
Incentives and bonuses are granted to managers and administrators as well as penalties are
charged in order to enhance the administrative efficiency.
In fact, the aim of the model remains twofold:
a) maximization of the benefits deriving from the creation of external economies
produced by public goods at various jurisdictional levels;
b) reduction of  coordination and transaction costs engendered within the model.
The main priority of the cohesion policy is to achieve economic convergence across different
territorial areas (Leonardi, 1998; European Commission, 2001, 2004). Such a priority is further
confirmed by the choice of the particular instruments used to achieve the stated set of goals in the
MLG model.
Regulations, strategic guidelines, operational plans and programs adopted by EU are
characterized by:
i) interrelations with territorial jurisdiction levels (regulations and strategic guidelines at
community level, planning at national level, programs at regional level and further);
ii) multi-task profile (this characteristic has been greatly weakened by the most recent Structural
Funds Reform that generalises the “one-program one-Fund” principle);
iii) mutually excludability (non-overlapping jurisdictions);
8
iv) multi-fund structure, financed by communitarian Structural Funds and, according to the
context, either by central government or by both central and regional funds;
v) institutional actors general agreement based on negotiations in which the first three
hierarchical levels of the model (EU, State, regions) are generally involved;
vi) procedural itinerary rigorously shaped in all its phases from set-up to implementation of the
program through a pathway of rigid regulations, difficult to modify;
vii) partial hierarchy, in as much as the program or the jurisdiction’s plan upstream is supported by
the lower jurisdiction.
Acts, guidelines, strategic program frameworks and programs that go from the EU to Local
Authorities have been produced (descending path): Structural Funds finance different kinds of
operational (regional as well as national) programs that allow for strategies that can vary from region
to region.
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policy makers at different levels of government, should achieve the goals fixed by each program for its
own jurisdictional level. Therefore, an opposite path, i.e. the bottom-up system, to be effective
requires the coherence of goals fixed at each jurisdictional levels (programs “external coherence”).
The more one climbs the jurisdictions hierarchical ladder, the more goals become representative of the
common interests of large population and the more actions taken by the jurisdictional entities at lower
levels represent a constraint in the achievement of those general goals. As already discussed, this
means that: (i) programs worked out at different jurisdictional levels have to be functionally
connected; (ii) each level of government has to be efficient, in order to make efficient the whole
governance system.
There are no functional dependencies among the results attained by jurisdictions belonging to
the same level (i.e. each region is coordinated with another in few cases). Therefore, at a given level
(e.g. regional), programs can only find unity and general coherence at the upper jurisdictional level.
This assumption is coherent with the goal of minimising coordination costs.
The Italian experience at the end of the 1990s, known as nuova programmazione (“new
programming”), is an example of national policy of harmonization inside the MLG model (Ministero
del Tesoro, 1998, 1999).
This experience has been developed on the basis of three strategic choices, extremely relevant:
1. full acceptance of the institutional MLG model both at communitarian and national territorial
policy level;
2. adoption of the neo-corporative model as the basis for the national economic policy;
3. substantial reform of the Public Administration, particularly in the Objective 1 regions. In fact,
the Community Structural Framework Ob. 1 2000-2006 confers relevance to the actions of
capacity building to increment administrative efficiency at all levels of government.
3. The empowerment of regional and local authorities in Italy
A strong process of fiscal decentralization starts in Italy, from legislative and administrative
point of view, by the second half of 1990s. In that period, Italy experiments the remodelling of
national policies towards a more effective decisional power at regional and local level. The process
leads to a full application of the MLG model, as above described, which is seen as the ordinary way to
govern the relationships between different jurisdictional levels, all of them aimed at the same common
objective: to enhance the level of economic and social welfare in the population.
Scholars agree in identifying the first step of this process with the start, in 1998, of the policy
named nuova programmazione (“new programming”) that introduces the key role of the intra-
jurisdictional dialogue as a fundamental instrument in defining political action at different territorial
levels. As a consequence, regions and the other local governments assume new functions and
responsibilities especially in order to take decisions about fiscal policy: decentralized fiscal policy is
almost exclusively limited to the expenditure side and, more precisely, to the capital expenditure,
while the revenue side still remains, de facto, under the central control.
The trigger of those choices may be found at least in two reasons:
 i) the growing relevance of communitarian structural plans in co-financing capital expenditures
at regional level (“external” reason);
 ii) the new course of national policy, with the rise of new parties and the introduction of the
federalist objective as an important political goal (“internal” reason).
Both reasons relies on the same intuitive logic: likely regional capital expenditures have more
capacity to catch local differences in population preferences and so, as a consequence, have more
effectiveness in enhancing economic development than central policies (Oates, 1993). The issue is not
if the same public investment is more efficient when developed by local government than by central
one, but rather if the investment, that eventually local government realizes, would have been realized
8by the central level in any case (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). If not, one may argue that
fiscal decentralization could have some effects on economic growth or that it could possibly be found
a positive relationship between jurisdictional composition of public expenditure and per capita Gross
Domestic Product.
For the sake of clarity, the more (regional) administration is efficient and effective, the more
public (regional) policy matches and satisfies (regional) demand. On the contrary, an inefficient
regional system could probably not be able to implement the expected investments, even if the
regional politicians have the right perception of the local needs.
The will to adopt the principles of MLG and to follow a path of regionalization should favour,
in an indirect manner, a strong increase in administrative efficiency in running policies for
development, at regional and local level. When the public action fails in obtaining higher level of
efficiency and effectiveness, the existence of a very weak effect, if any, between decentralization and
variations in GDP per capita should be verified.
The process in the Italian case is characterized by:
 i) the redistribution of responsibilities and administrative functions between central and regional
governments;
 ii) the rationalization of the administrative action at central level (Claroni, 2000; Barca 2001;
Bagarani and Bonetti, 2005, 2006);
 iii) the reorganization of the rules governing the institutional dialogue between central state and
regions (Claroni 2000; Ferrara, 2003; Piattoni, 2003), including the clauses of bonuses-
penalties used as an instrument to provide incentives in creating efficiency at central and local
level (Anselmo et al., 2003; Brezzi et al., 2004);
 iv) the acceptance of the New Public Management approach (Pollit, 1990; Osborne and Gaebler,
1992; Pierre and Peters, 2000).
As a consequence of the latter point, public companies gain a growing relevance in managing
public capital expenditure even at local level. Actually, decentralization is thought as an effective
“devolution of political decision-making power” and not only as a “mere administrative delegation of
functions of the central government to local branches” (Bardhan, 2002, p. 186). On the fiscal policy
side, the redistribution of responsibilities drives to the creation of some specific instruments for
programming the national, not co-financed, expenditure, with increasing complexity in managing the
national and regional development programs. On the legislative “prerogatives” side, regions obtain a
large autonomy, including numerous aspects “except (the ones) for the determination of the
fundamental principles which represent the legislative prerogatives of the State” (Costituzione
Italiana, Art. 117).
Structural Funds has called for a decisive orientation of policies towards horizontal European
objectives and a major efficiency of the Italian administrative system (Fabbrini, 2003; Wishlade et al.,
2003; Graziano, 2003, 2004; Gualini, 2003, 2004; Bull and Baudner, 2004) accompanied by a more
responsible administration of Local Authorities (Dente, 1999; Claroni, 2000; Viesti, 2001a; 2001b;
Bagarani, 2005; Bagarani and Bonetti, 2005, 2006). In this framework, regions obtain exclusive
“prerogatives” for: agriculture; handicraft; building; public works; human capital (labour policies and
training); industrial policy; tourism; transport; and road network management.
Still today, the issue of the theoretical and political validity of the legislative autonomy of the
regions is subject for debate (Viesti, 2001a; Di Matteo, 2003; Vassallo, 2004). Equally, confrontation
on the even more delicate questions concerning regions financial autonomy is still open (Bordignon
and Cerniglia, 2004; ISAE, 2006).
In general, the theory and the empirical studies on fiscal policies of decentralization give little
attention to the effects on economic growth. Most of the studies focus on the gains in terms of
economic efficiency due to a higher capacity to match the consumer preference scheme. Some of them
9try to analyze the impact of decentralization, or public expenditure composition, on macroeconomic
performance and economic growth or development.
9
4. Data
The work in hand is based on three different data sets. First of all, information presented in
Conti Pubblici Territoriali data set (Regional Public Accounts, RPA), developed by the Italian
Ministry of Economic Development (MED), are used. The RPA data set provides, inter alia, detailed
information about government consolidate expenditure in Italy at different institutional levels, i.e.
central, regional and local level. The analysis focuses on the available data on public capital
expenditures at different government levels in the period 1996-2005. Furthermore, the study relies on
the information offered by Conti Economici Regionali data set (Regional Economic Accounts, REA),
worked out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and providing relevant data on
regional socioeconomic characteristics in the period 1994-2005 (e.g. GDP levels, regional
demographic size, economic activities, income production, etc.) Finally, information collected by both
ISTAT and MED on regional socioeconomic indicators,
10
 i.e. the Statistics for development policy
data set and, in particular, the Indicatori di contesto chiave e variabili di rottura (Key indicators and
baseline variables), included in Statistiche per le Politiche di Sviluppo data set (Statistics for
development policies), are introduced.
The analysis uses four categories of explanatory variables:
i) public capital expenditures recorded at different governance level (central, regional, local and
public companies level), in order to capture the impact of decentralization processes on
regional GDP dynamics;
ii) “political variables” represented by dummies where value 1 is assigned to regions governed by
left parties;
iii) “social variables”, such as education rates, crime rate, employment rate in social services,
level of household per capita expenditure for culture, rate of irregular workers;
iv) “economic variables”, such as employment rate, unemployment rate, export, net import,
investment, research, interest rate spread, investment risk;
v) “communitarian variable” represented by a dummy variable where value 1 is assigned to
regions included in Objective 1.
5. Empirical analysis
This section presents the main results deriving from the analysis of regional data. At first,
macroeconomic framework and dynamic behaviour of regional and macro areas economic aggregates
are depicted. Secondly, an econometric evaluation of the impact of decentralization on GDP per capita
utilizing cross-sectional models is developed.
Finally, panel data models are used in order to investigate the determinants of time variation in
GDP per capita and, in particular, to focus the role of central and local expenditure.
5.1 Macroeconomic framework
Table 2 shows the most important results on the distribution of regional GDP per capita during
the period 1994-2005. Levels of GDP per capita characterizing the Italian Southern regions are
constantly lower than the GDP values recorded in the North and in the Centre. This result is indeed not
surprising as Southern regions represent the less developed areas in the country.
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In this context, although the South has been involved in national and communitarian
development policies, GDP per capita growth rates seem to be not significantly different from the
growth rates characterizing Northern and Central Italian regions. As a consequence, these results may
indeed describe the South as distinguished by historical and structural underdevelopment constraints
(Graph 2).
Table 2: Regional GDP per capita by macro areas- Period 1994-2005.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Per capita GDP
North 19,237.0    19,972.5    20,136.0    20,489.5    20,744.6    20,958.8    21,839.9    22,077.1    21,947.9    21,723.5    21,587.7    21,416.9    
Centre 16,865.8    17,380.9    17,524.0    17,722.6    18,104.8    18,372.8    19,251.3    19,734.2    19,440.4    19,220.7    19,158.7    19,090.9    
South 10,643.5    10,689.5    10,781.7    11,059.9    11,301.2    11,576.7    12,058.6    12,222.2    12,286.2    12,105.8    12,094.1    12,073.2    
Per capita GDP growth rate
North 3.8 0.8 1.8 1.2 1.0 4.2 1.1 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8
Centre 3.1 0.8 1.1 2.2 1.5 4.8 2.5 -1.5 -1.1 -0.3 -0.4
South 0.4 0.9 2.6 2.2 2.4 4.2 1.4 0.5 -1.5 -0.1 -0.2
Source: ISTAT Regional Economic Accounts
Graph 2: Macro areas GDP per capita dynamics.
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The analysis of the GDP per capita dynamics characterizing the full set of Italian regions
substantially support the results previously discussed by emphasizing intra-group economic
differences. In addition, it allows to further investigate the development processes at micro level by
stressing the existence of divergent patterns of growth in different time periods. As expected by
analyzing economic performances at national level, year 2001 represents a point of discontinuity. In
fact, a substantial positive economic trend, characterizing in general all regions in the period 1995-
2001 is found out. Nevertheless, since 2002, GDP growth rates show negative widespread
performances. The dynamics of regional GDP recorded on average in the two different periods firmly
confirm this conclusion (Graph 3).
In this framework, it is indeed interesting the analysis of the main results derived by
investigating regional performances in terms of economic convergence dynamics. The full set of
regions is grouped by identifying Northern and Central areas as the mainly developed ones and
defining the Southern regions as structurally poor areas.
Graph 4 figures differences in GDP growth rates between Northern-Central and Southern
macro-areas. By looking at Graph 4, in a first draft, it may be rather difficult to find out a
homogeneous temporal behaviour: results indicate as exclusively the period 1995-1998 shows a
convergence process between developed regions and regions characterized by inadequate economic
performances. Nevertheless, temporal dynamics of GDP per capita levels stress the existence of a
significant trend of convergence.
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Graph 3: Average regional GDP per capita growth rates dynamics, 1995-2001 and 2002-2005.
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Graph 4: Economic convergence -  The temporal dynamics of differences between North-Centre and South
per capita GDP growth rates, 1995-2005
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In Graph 5, the development process of the North-Centre GDP per capita with respect to the
performances recorded by the South area as a whole, is represented (the very simple index adopted in
this case is: 
pcSOUTHi
CENTREipcNORTH
Y
Y
−
).
Results indicate as from 1994 to 2005 the ratio between GDP per capita values of the two
different macro regions shows a rather homogenous decreasing trend, in that South seems to grow
faster than Northern-Central regions.
Though it is indeed difficult to find out a convergence trend by analyzing differences in
growth rates for each reference period, a long-term process of convergence is identified by
investigating development process through cumulative results, derived from GDP dynamics.
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Graph 5: Ratio between North-Centre and South per capita GDP – Years 1995-2005
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Interesting findings come from the study of decentralization of public expenditure. Differences
between Northern-Central regions and the less developed areas of the South are also emphasized by
the analysis of the distribution of public expenditure among four different governance levels: central,
regional, local administration and public companies.
11
 In general, empirical evidence stresses the
development of centralization processes in the Northern and the Central regions, South areas being
strongly involved in process of expenditure allocation dominated by central government policy and
resources. Nevertheless, temporal dynamics of public expenditure allocation between different levels
of government during the period 1996-2005 has to be further investigated as it shown a not
homogenous trend across regions. In particular, the Index of Specialization (ISP) (Lo Cascio, 1984) is
adopted, in order to identify the existence of decentralization processes trough different areas in Italy.
It can be represented as:
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where Xij is the expenditure amount of the region i at the administrative level j.
This index has a maximum equal to 1 (highest specialization) and a minimum equal to -1
(absence of expenses, i.e. lowest specialization).
As shown in Table 3, two opposite patterns of expenditure distribution across government
levels are found out.
First of all, at each level of government, regions with an ISP ≥ 0.5 are defined as specialized
regions. In this framework, decentralization processes during three different periods, i.e. 1996, 2000
and 2005, are investigated. Results show as the process of decentralization appears to be rather
consistent in the North during the first wave, while it decreases during later periods.
                                                
11
 The term “public companies” includes the following institution: i) public national enterprises; ii) public local
enterprises.
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Table 3: Expenditure distribution across government levels – Specialization index – Years 1996, 2000, 2005
Years
Regions Central Regional Local
Public 
companies
Central Regional Local
Public 
companies
Central Regional Local
Public 
companies
Piemonte 0.096 0.101
Valle d'Aosta 0.567 0.605 0.443 0.158
Lombardia 0.152 0.273 0.408 0.416
Liguria 0.126 0.160 0.157 0.069
Trentino A. A. 0.613 0.176 0.632 0.067 0.641
Veneto 0.168 0.128
Friuli V. G. 0.316 0.067 0.231 0.081 0.228
Emilia R. 0.154 0.061 0.267 0.172
Toscana 0.069 0.119 0.185 0.145
Umbria 0.104 0.052 0.159
Marche 0.149 0.120 0.082
Lazio 0.188 0.219 0.275
Abruzzo 0.080 0.054 0.097 0.088
Molise 0.253 0.062 0.279 0.158 0.235
Campania 0.110 0.113 0.079 0.056
Puglia 0.094 0.122 0.193
Basilicata 0.085 0.080 0.095 0.146 0.178
Calabria 0.089 0.191 0.091 0.206 0.205
Sicilia 0.426 0.169 0.114 0.331
Sardegna 0.485 0.380 0.398
20051996 2000
Source: elaboration on Ministry of Economic Development – Regional Public Accounts – data set
In fact, an increase in the public spending promoted by public bodies, which in turn belong to
the central government can be found out. It is worth noting that, during the same span of time,
Southern regions, though in general characterized by high centralization of public expenditure, seem
to further decrease their decentralization propensity. In this framework, data analysis stresses as high
levels of regional expenditures characterize mainly autonomous regions (i.e. Valle d’Aosta, Trentino
Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia and Sardegna), endowed with special constitutional laws.
5.2 Cross-section analysis
The work in hand tries to evaluate the contribute of decentralization to economic growth,
using a specific set of data representing the sharing of capital expenditures among different
governance levels in each regional territory. As discussed above, fiscal decentralization is analysed
exclusively examining capital expenditures dynamics, i.e. excluding, at least in this exercise, both
current expenditures and revenues. This represents, of course, an analysis limitation, but it is coherent
with the idea to evaluate the MLG (and therefore communitarian) approach in its main aspect: the
Structural Fund development policy at regional level.
The degree of devolution is defined as the ratio between regional and local expenditures on
central expenditures for each regional territory.
With this assumption, the share of regional and local expenditure on total expenditure for each
region in the period 1996-2003 is adopted as decentralization indicator.
The use of only one indicator to capture the dimension of the decentralization phenomenon
may raise some doubts. On the other hand, the relevant role played by this variable in the recent
decentralization process in the Italian case needs to be considered.
Table 4 presents the results of eight cross-sectional linear models based on a sample of 18
regions: each of the 8 models represents a cross-section regression for one specific year, starting from
1996 and ending in 2003.
12
 OLS model are used in this analysis and the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of GDP per capita at regional level.
                                                
12
 Two regions are excluded from the original sample of 20 cases: Valle d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige. They
are both autonomous regions with a much higher political and legislative autonomy and both of them are
bilingual regions. They sensibly differ from the other regions included in the analysis and they are considered as
undesirable outliers.
14
The most relevant finding is that the estimated coefficient of decentralization indicator is
positive and significant only in the first three cross-section models (1996, 1997 and 1998). In the other
five models (from 1999 to 2003) the coefficient becomes not significant, with a negative sign in four
cases. These results are rather surprising considering that the decentralization policy substantially
starts in 1999: empirical evidence shows that the positive effects of decentralization on GDP are
produced only in the period 1996-1998. It seems that the political action directed to realize
decentralization process had a counterintuitive effect.
As above discussed, one possible reason could rely on the key role played by the capacity of
local administration to operate with an adequate level of efficiency and effectiveness. The reallocation
of political power from the central to the not fully efficient and effective local administrations results
in a loss of ability to positively affect the regional economic system.
The second relevant finding concerns the education variable. A negative relationship between
regional human capital endowments and per capita GDP is found out. It is due to the different
distribution of employment opportunities between Southern poor regions and Northern-Central more
developed ones. In the rich regions of the North, the high labour demand is competitive with school
programs attendance, while in the poor regions of the South the lack of labour opportunities may
represents an incentive to increase schooling levels.
It is worth noting the negative sign associated to the coefficients of the crime variable. The
crime indicator is computed as a time index of the variation in the number of criminal acts, with
1995=100. Negative signs associate growing level of crime to lower level of GDP per capita, it means
that crime grows in Southern regions. Even if this conclusion seems to be coherent with the common
sense, actually the analysis of data shows as the simple correlation between crime and GDP per capita
is direct and positive. It is not surprising if one looks at the series and rethinks the recent history of
Italian regions. Under this particular point of view, the expected sign of the coefficient should have
been positive instead of negative. This aspect could represent a specific issue for further investigation.
Finally, the coefficients of the variables representing the openness to international markets
(export and net import), the labour market characteristics (employment/unemployment rates), the
economic environment of the private activities (expenditures in research, interest rate spread,
investment risk) present the expected signs and are significant in most of the cases.
5.3 Panel data analysis
OLS panel fixed-effects models are used to investigate the determinants of the inter-temporal
dynamics of regional per capita GDP. A panel of 18 groups (regions) over a period of eight years,
from 1996 to 2003, is used.
13
Models introduce public capital per capita expenditures as the explanatory variables
describing the decentralization process (instead of the more synthetic indicator adopted in cross-
sectional models above). Logarithm of regional GDP per capita is investigated by using four different
models. Each model tries to explain the GDP dynamics by introducing different proxies for
decentralization, i.e. central, regional, local and public companies expenditures. The aim is to evaluate
the decentralization impact from the four different points of view representing the four different
governance levels.
As shown in Table 5, results substantially confirm the findings of the cross-sectional analysis.
Central policies, represented either by central government or public companies expenditures,
are negative related with GDP dynamics and coefficients are adequately significant. This is coherent
with the positive signs associated to the decentralization indicator used in the previous section, at least
in the first three models (years 1996, 1997 and 1998).
                                                
13
 The Hausman test is performed and the hypothesis of random effects is rejected (Hausman, 1978).
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Vice versa, local policies, represented by regional or alternatively local expenditures, show
positive and significant coefficients, although they are significant only at 10% level. As before these
findings are coherent with the results from the cross-section analysis.
Whatever the variable used as a proxy for decentralization, it is worth noting the very low
values assumed by the coefficients: they show the very weak ability of public expenditures, realized
by each single jurisdictional level, to affect regional GDP.
Therefore, the contribution of the MLG institutional model to the dynamic and the dimension
of GDP is rather limited. This particularly true if one compares the obtained results with the political,
administrative and legislative effort made in Italy during the last fifteen years to shape a new
jurisdictional system.
The signs associated to all the remaining variables do not show any change with respect to the
results got in the previous analysis.
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Table 4: Determinants of regional GDP per capita (1996-2003): a cross-section analysis.
Indipendent variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Decentralization rate 0,511 0,380 0,419 -0,285 -0,148 -0,113 0,237 -0,072
(3.41)*** (1.93)* (2.39)**  (-1,67)  (-0,83)  (-0,83) (1,67)  (-0,31)
EU priority 
a
-0,180 -0,224
 (-3.11)** (-3.84)***
Education -0,005 -0,016 -0,009 -0,008 -0,006
 (-1,60) (-3.75)***  (-1,65) (-1.89)*  (-1,60)
Education (age 15-19) 0,028
(1,32)
Culture -0,057
 (-1,47)
Social services 0,043 0,018
(3.67)*** (2.81)**
Crime -0,002 -0,003 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001
(-3.98)*** (-2.12)*  (-1,77) (-2.95)* (-2.21)**
Irregular -0,023
(-4.02)***
Unemployment -0,007 -0,024 -0,032
(-1.92)* (-5.09)*** (-8.23)***
Employment 0,014 0,025 0,015
(2.55)** (6.93)*** (4.12)***
Net import -0,008 -0,011 -0,006
(-3.57)*** (-3.76)*** (-1.87)*
Research 0,107 0,202 0,144
(2.86)** (6.04)*** (2.89)**
Interest rate spread -0,048 -0,101 -0,027 -0,104 -0,062 -0,045
(-2.95)** (-4.91)***  (-0,87) (-4.28)*** (-2.41)** (-1.98)*
Investment risk 0,033571
(2.1)*
Constant 10,293 11,330 10,101 9,167 8,586 9,557 9,862 7,265
(47.47)*** (36.38)*** (32.13)*** (18.39)*** (44.31)*** (29.58)*** (50.39)*** (3.58)***
Obs. Numb. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Residual df 10 12 12 11 12 11 12 12
Model df 7 5 5 6 5 6 5 5
R2 0,98991 0,96982 0,96507 0,97711 0,96262 0,9764 0,97506 0,96674
Adjusted R2 0,98285 0,95724 0,95052 0,96462 0,94705 0,96353 0,96467 0,95288
F 140,22 77,117 66,318 78,247 61,807 75,857 93,832 69,75
1
 t values in parenthesis. Level of significance: *** 10%; ** 5%; * 1%. Absence of heteroskedasticity was
verified with Breusch-Pagan test in each model
a 
 Dummy variable
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Table 5: Determinants of regional per capita GDP dynamics (1996-2003): a panel data analysis
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Central per capita expenditure -0,000022
(-1,78)*
Regional per capita expenditure 0,000067
(1,91)*
Local per capita expenditure 0,000044
(1,79)*
Companies per capita expenditure -0,000080
(-3,08)***
Regional government 
a
-0,0038 -0,0153 -0,0152 -0,0119
(-0,79) (-3,02)*** (-2,69)*** (-2,17)**
National government 
a
-0,0051
(-6,66)***
Education (age 15-19) -0,0030
(-1,49)
Education (age 20-24) 0,0019 0,0023 0,0023
(2,37)** (2,25)** (2,29)**
Education -0,0048 -0,0099 -0,0057 -0,0067
(-3,89)*** (-20,83)*** (-4,74)*** (-5,88)***
Social services 0,0024 0,0032 0,0036
(-1,49) (1,75)* (2,05)**
Crime 0,0002 0,0002 0,0002
(2,68)*** (1,97)* (2,6)**
Irregular 0,0021 0,0042 0,0036
(-1,22) (2,24)** (2,01)**
Unemployment -0,0043 -0,0060
(-2,25)** (-3,21)***
Employment 0,0060
(3,44)***
Export 0,00497
(3,98)***
Net import -0,002307 -0,007338 -0,003426 -0,00349
(-2,68)*** (-6,01)*** (-3,14)*** (-3,29)***
Investment 0,006864
(4,74)***
Research 0,0480 0,0232
(2,97)*** (-1,24)
Interest rate spread -0,0158 -0,0091 -0,0166 -0,0156
(-3,86)*** (-1,98)** (-3,23)*** (-3,12)***
Constant 10,445 10,29 9,7849 9,926
(39,55)*** (49,44)*** (74,95)*** (79,05)***
Obs. Numb. 144 144 144 144
R2 0,8969 0,8828 0,8539 0,8598
F 100,87 87,408 61,088 71,139
1
 t values in parenthesis. Level of significance: *** 10%; ** 5%; * 1%.
a 
 Dummy variables
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6. Concluding remarks
The article investigates two issues: (i) to what extent the reorganization of the Italian system is
coherent with the main features of the EU MLG system in the governance of territorial policies; (ii) to
what extent the decentralization in programming policies of development has gone with a transfer of
capital expenses from central (Central Administrations) to local (Regions and local bodies)
jurisdictions and how relevant the impact on of the decentralization process on GDP is.
The analysis highlights that the institutional decentralization so far recorded in Italy is not
fully shareable, neither with regard the coherence with the main features of the EU MLG, nor with
regard to the consequent symmetrical transfer of capital expenses from the Central Government’s
jurisdiction to local bodies’, according to the theory of fiscal federalism.
The main conclusions that can be withdrawn from the analysis are:
1. the Italian decentralization of structural interventions (Italian territorial policy) in the last ten
years is strongly led by the MLG system that characterizes the EU “cohesion policy”.
Nevertheless, the institutional framework produced by Constitutional reforms is not always
consistent with the principles of EU MLG. In particular, we can state that there are many
levels of jurisdictions. Also, there are too many super-impositions of the “prerogatives”
among governing levels. These institutional shortcomings involve high coordination costs,
low economic efficiency and decisional conflicts;
2. the process of empowerment of regions and local bodies, the administrative reforms and the
financing of capacity building of the Southern regions contribute to overcome the old
inefficient policy making model of structural policies. In doing so, the present Italian
territorial policy is both less centralized and less hierarchical, but the improvement of
administrative efficiency and effectiveness so far recorded is insufficient. Moreover, such an
institutional model generates many latent institutional conflicts, that reduce the economic
impacts of the reforms;
3. the Constitutional decentralization of “prerogatives” is not followed by an actual symmetrical
transfer of capital expenses from Central to local jurisdictions. The trend of decentralization of
capital public expenditure is significant only at the end of 1990s. In the last five years this
trend decrease, in particular in the Southern regions;
4. the effects on economic convergence between Northern and Southern regions are clearly
insignificant, especially after 2000. Some economic divergence phenomena appear in the last
five years;
5. the impacts of the decentralization policies on GDP considered under both dynamic and
dimensional aspects are insignificant as well. The process of decentralization is significant
only in the period before the introduction of the MLG model in Italy. When the effective
implementation starts, the decentralization looses its significance, confirming a very weak
relationship with the economic component of the regional systems;
6. even when the expenditure activated by the different jurisdictional levels becomes significant,
the dimension of the impacts is substantially irrelevant;
7. it seems reasonable to state the hypothesis that this new model has to face the challenge of the
empowerment of local administrations in order to achieve a higher level of efficiency and
ability to match the preferences of the local populations;
8. the complex reform seems to find a justification more in internal and external political
pressures than in reasons based on the growth of social and economic welfare.
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